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CONCERNS FOR THE POORLY OFF IN2
ORDERING RISKY PROSPECTS3
LUC BOVENS∗4
5
Abstract: The Distribution View provides a model that integrates four6
distributional concerns in the evaluation of risky prospects. Starting from7
these concerns, we can generate an ordering over a set of risky prospects,8
or, starting from an ordering, we can extract a characterization of the9
underlying distributional concerns. Separability of States and/or Persons10
for multiple-person risky prospects, for single-person risky prospects and11
for multiple-person certain prospects are discussed within the model. The12
Distribution View sheds light on public health policies and provides a13
framework for the discussion of Parfit’s Priority View for risky prospects.14
Keywords: Prioritarianism, risk, prospects, separability, equally-15
distributed-equivalent16
1. THE CHALLENGE17
A social planner is facing a set of alternative policies that will affect18
people’s well-being in different ways and there is risk – i.e. each person’s19
well-being may be affected in one way or another depending on what20
state of the world actualizes. There are many types of policies that fit this21
pattern. Here are three examples from different spheres of policy making.22
First, the government takes a vote on alternative alcohol policies. A lenient23
policy will provide affordable alcohol, will permit people to purchase and24
enjoy alcoholic drinks freely, but some people will face the risk of alcohol-25
related diseases, injuries and casualties. Amore stringent policy will make26
alcohol less affordable and accessible, but will cut back on alcohol-related27
risks. Second, a medical board is charged with determining an allocation28
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of available transplant organs to potential recipients. Depending on who29
will and will not get an organ, chances of survival and future quality of30
life will be very different for the people who are currently on the waiting31
list. And third, a military strategist assesses different battle plans which32
will affect the risks of injuries and fatalities to different troops in different33
ways.34
We can represent such policies in an abstract way, viz. as prospects. A35
prospect is a matrix in which the rows represent persons and the columns36
represent states of the world with a probability function defined over37
the states. If a particular state j of the world actualizes, then person i38
will be facing a particular outcome oij. Each entry in the matrix contains39
a utility value uij = u(oij) reflecting the risk attitudes of person i (for i =40
1, . . . , n) towards the outcome in state j (for j = 1, . . . , m). Utilities are41
interpersonally comparable and defined on a ratio scale with the worst42
outcome that a personmight expect in the type of prospects that are under43
consideration represented by zero. For example, for organ allocations,44
zero would be the utility of imminent death. More will be said about the45
interpretation of the utility values in section 3. Let a personal prospect be46
one row of such a matrix – i.e. a description of the prospect as it affects a47
particular person.48
One technique for comparing prospects is to construct a utilitarian49
ranking on grounds of a utilitarian value function.1 There is an ex ante and50
an ex post route to constructing the utilitarian value function, both yielding51
the same value for the prospect on this function.52
Here is the ex ante route. The social planner first calculates the53
expectation of the utility for each personal prospect and subsequently54
calculates the mean of these expectations. Hence the value of a prospect55
L is vUT I L (L) =
∑n
i=1 wi
∑m
j=1 p j ui j for i = persons 1, . . . , n, j = states 1,56
. . . , m, and wi = 1/n. (I assume throughout that all persons i have equal57
weight wi, though this assumption can readily be relaxed.)58
Now for the ex post route. By simple algebra,
∑n
i=1 wi
∑m
j=1 p j ui j =59 ∑m
j=1 p j
∑n
i=1 wi ui j . The right hand side of the equation is the ex post route.60
The social planner first calculates the social utility of each state, i.e. the61
mean utility of each state, and subsequently the expectation of these social62
utilities.63
The utilitarian ranking is defined by the utilitarian value function:64
L∗  L# ⇔ vUT I L (L∗) ≥ vUT I L (L#)(1.1)
1 In his aggregation theorem, Harsanyi (1955) showed that, if one wants to respect certain
constraints, then one must use a generalized utilitarian value function (in which equal
weights are not assured) to construct a ranking over prospects. The precise interpretation
of the theorem is still a matter of debate. See e.g. Weymark (1991).
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State 1 State 2
L∗ p = .3 (1–p) = .7
Person 1 20 1
Person 2 2 4
TABLE 1. Prospect L∗.
L# p = 1
Person 1 5
Person 2 5
TABLE 2. Prospect L#.
However, real-life social planners may not want to order prospects in this65
manner. To see this, consider the prospects L∗ and L# in Tables 1 and 2.66
A simple interpretation of these prospects runs as follows. In prospect67
L∗, there is a 30% chance that person 1 will receive $20 and person 268
$2, and there is a 70% chance that person 1 will receive $1 and person69
2 $4. In prospect L# both persons will receive $5 for sure. Both persons are70
risk neutral in money, i.e. their utility functions display constant marginal71
utility for money.72
How should we rank these prospects? On the utilitarian value73
function vUTIL, L∗  L# since vUTIL(L∗) = 5.05 > 5 = vUTIL(L#). However,74
it would not seem unreasonable for a social planner to rank L#  L∗.75
To justify her choice, she might point to her concerns for the poorly off76
relative to certain distributional features of the prospect. She might point77
out that, on L∗, (i) no matter what happens, there will be inequalities with78
some people ending up poorly off; (ii) there is risk involved for both and79
both may end up poorly off; (iii) society may end up poorly off if state 280
actualizes; (iv) person 2 is poorly off in that she faces a poor expectation.81
Our challenge is the following: Can we give some systematic account82
of these concerns for the poorly off? How can we measure these concerns?83
My aim is to construct a method to compare uncertain prospects that takes84
into account these concerns for the poorly off relative to distributional85
features of the prospect. This method will permit us to register a social86
planner’s concerns and determine an ordering over prospects. It will also87
permit us to take a social planner’s ordering over prospects and unveil88
what her concerns are. Finally, it will permit us to cast light on some actual89
policy issues and on the debate about Parfit’s Priority View. An historical90
overview of the literature on the assessment of risky prospects, including91
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S1 S2
p(S1) = .5 p(S2) = .5
P1 u11 u12
P2 u21 u22
TABLE 3. A Simple Prospect.
references to recent work, can be found in Fleurbaey (2010: 649–52). See92
also McCarthy (2006, 2008) and Adler (2012).93
2. PRO-POORLY-OFF CONCERNS94
A utilitarian can say that, overall, the people are poorly off in a prospect95
on grounds of the fact that it confers low average expected utility. But96
there are other ways of being poorly off in a prospect when we attend to97
distributional concerns. There are various distributions that may matter.98
We generalize our observations concerning L∗ and L#.99
(i) Intra-State Distribution. A person may be poorly off in that a state100
may actualize in which he2 is at a low utility level, relative to the101
utility levels that other persons are at in this state.102
(ii) Intra-Personal-Prospect Distribution. A person may be poorly off in103
that a state may actualize in which he is at a low utility level, relative104
to the utility level that he would have been at, had other states105
actualized.106
(iii) Inter-State Distribution. A collective may be poorly off in that a state107
may actualize in which the mean utility level is low, relative to108
the mean utility levels that it would have been at, had other states109
actualized.110
(iv) Inter-Personal-Prospect Distribution. A person may be poorly off111
in that he may have a low expectation of utility, relative to the112
expectations of other persons.113
Now how can we take into account these concerns for the poorly off? Let114
us take a simple case in which we have a prospect for two people and two115
states that have equal probability p(S1) = p(S2) = .5. This information is116
expressed in Table 3.117
2 I use the female pronoun for the social planner and the male pronoun for the persons in
the prospect.
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Let us also assume in this section that a social planner is motivated by118
at most one pro-poorly-off concern. I will lay out a method to represent the119
extent to which a social planner is motivated by each such pro-poorly-off120
concern. In section 4 I will model a social planner who is motivated by121
multiple concerns.122
Intra-state distribution123
Suppose that we have a distribution of utility <u1j = 16, u2j = 4> for124
persons 1 and 2 in state j. When a social planner considers this state j, she125
may not have any special concern for the poorly off: She just cares about126
the mean utility in this state. Hence she considers the distribution <u1j =127
16, u2j = 4> to be equally good as the distribution <u1j = 10, u2j = 10>:128
the goodness of the state equals the mean utility for her. Alternatively,129
she may have a special concern for the more poorly off person 2. If she130
is single-mindedly concerned about the more poorly off, then she would131
find the distribution <u1j = 16, u2j = 4> to be equally good as <u1j = 4,132
u2j = 4>: The goodness of the state is no better than the utility of the133
person who is worse off. And we can envision a range of positions in134
between these extremes, e.g. she might take <u1j = 16, u2j = 4> to be135
equally good as <u1j = 9, u2j = 9>.136
A social planner may also be indifferent between <u1j = 16, u2j = 4>137
and, say, <u1j = 16, u2j = 16>. Then she is single-mindedly concerned138
with the better off person. Or she may be indifferent between <u1j = 16,139
u2j = 4> and, say, <u1j = 12, u2j = 12>. Then she is not single-mindedly140
concerned with the better off, but still more concerned with the better off141
than a utilitarian would be. One could model such attitudes as well, but142
we will restrict ourselves here to social planners who are more concerned143
with the poorly off than a utilitarian.144
Take the distribution <u1j = x, u2j = x> with a particular number x145
in the interval [4, 10] such that the social planner is indifferent between146
<u1j = 16, u2j = 4> and <u1j = x, u2j = x>. Then we call x the equally-147
distributed equivalent (EDE) of the distribution <u1j = 16, u2j = 4>.148
Following Fleurbaey (2010), who is in turn following Kolm (1968) and149
Atkinson (1970: 250) on the measurement of income inequality, the EDEj150
is a measure of the goodness of the state j in the eyes of the social planner151
in so far as she is motivated by the intra-state distribution concern.152
We define a one-parameter function that has the following properties:153
The parameter α ranges from 0 to 1 and expresses the strength of the social154
planner’s intra-state distribution concern. The output of this function is the155
EDEj of the state j. Hence, for α = 0, it should yield EDEj = u. j , i.e. the156
mean utility of the state j, and for α = 1, it should yield EDEj = min(u1j,157
u2j). For intermediate values of α, the function should be continuous and158
strictly decreasing.159
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The following function does precisely this:160
χα(< u1, . . . ,un >) = ϕ−1α
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
ϕα(ui )
)
withϕα(ui ) = u
(
1− α(1−α)
)
i(2.1)
for ui ∈ (0,∞) andα[0, 1).3
Other functions also satisfy these desiderata. In section 5, I will discuss the161
choice of a separable function rather than a rank-order dependent function162
such as the single-parameter Gini in Donaldson and Weymark (1980: 74).163
We start with a simple example. Set α = 1/3 and note that ϕα=1/3(x)164
= x1/2 = x and ϕα=1/3−1(x) = x2. Then χα=1/3 (<u1j = 16, u2j = 4>) =165
(.516+.54)2 = 9. Notice furthermore that χα = 0(<u1j = 16, u2j = 4>) =166
10, χα→1(<u1j = 16, u2j = 4>) = 4, and χα (<u1j = 16, u2j = 4>) is a strictly167
decreasing function of α ∈ [0, 1).168
So α is a measure of the strength of the concern that the social planner169
has for the poorly off relative to intra-state distribution. The greater the170
value of α is, the lower the EDEj and hence the goodness of state j moves171
away from the mean utility in the direction of the utility of the worst off172
person in the state. To distinguish this parameter α from the α-parameters173
below, we will name it ‘αEDE’. And hence,174
E DE j = χαE DE (<u1 j ,u2 j>)(2.2)
A social planner who is solely concerned with intra-state distribution will175
order one prospect above another just in case the expectation of the176
goodness of the former prospect’s states exceeds the expectation of the177
goodness the latter prospect’s states. Or, in other words, she is concerned178
in this manner just in case the expectation of the EDEjs for states j = 1, 2179
in the former prospect exceeds the expectation of the EDEjs for states j =180
1, 2 in the latter prospect.181
L∗  E DE L# ⇔ vE DE (L∗) ≥ vE DE (L#)(2.3)
with vE DE (L) =
2∑
j=1
p j E DE j =
2∑
j=1
.5E DE j for j = states 1, 2.
This is an ex post evaluation. The social planner first determines the value182
of each social state and then calculates the expectation of the value of a183
social state.184
The three other concerns can be measured in the same way, mutatis185
mutandis.186
3 Limits need to be suitably defined as α goes to ½, as α goes to 1 and as x goes to 0. For
technical reasons, we need to define utilities over the open interval (0,). The problem is
that χα is a weakly, but not a strictly decreasing function of α ∈ [0, 1) if we admit utility
values equal to 0. For ease of presentation, we have utility values of zero in the text, but
one should read these values as limits tending to zero.
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Intra-personal-prospect distribution187
The social planner considers the distribution over person i’s utilities in188
different states of the world. Take, by means of example, a distribution189
<ui1 = 16, ui2 = 4> for person i in states 1 and 2. The risk absent equivalent190
(RAEi) is the goodness of person i’s personal prospect in the eyes of the social191
planner who is motivated by the intra-personal-prospect distribution concern.192
The RAEi of <ui1 = y, ui2 = z> is the value x such that the social planner193
would find <ui1 = x, ui2 = x> an equally good personal prospect as <ui1194
= y, ui2 = z>. In the same way as before, I appeal to the χα function with195
αRAE as a measure of the strength of this concern characterizing the social196
planner. Hence,197
RAEi = χαRAE (<ui1,ui2>)(2.4)
A social planner who is solely concerned about the Intra-Personal-Prospect198
Distribution will order one prospect above another just in case the mean of199
the RAEis for persons i = 1, 2 in the former exceeds the mean of the RAEis200
for persons i = 1, 2 in the latter.201
L∗  RAE L# ⇔ vRAE (L∗) ≥ vRAE (L#)(2.5)
with vRAE (L) =
2∑
i=1
wi RAEi =
2∑
i=1
.5RAEi for i = persons 1, 2
This is an ex ante evaluation. The social planner first considers the value of202
a personal prospect and then, assuming equal weights, she calculates the203
mean value.204
Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009) and Otsuka (2015) argue that a social205
planner has strong reason to conform her judgement to the judgements of206
the persons in the prospect. They take the utilities in the matrix to reflect207
the risk attitudes implied by each person’s ideally rational, fully informed208
(save for which state will actualize) and self-interested preferences. To say209
that i’s personal prospect is <ui1 = 16, ui2 = 4> is to say that the person in210
question would be indifferent (if fully informed) and should be indifferent211
(if ideally rational) between <ui1 = 16, ui2 = 4> and <ui1 = 10, ui2 = 10>212
when attending to her self-interest. This, they claim, provides the social213
planner with strong reason not to rank <ui1 = 10, ui2 = 10> over <ui1214
= 16, ui2 = 4>. ‘Moreover’, Otsuka (2015: 5) claims, ‘this reason is not215
decisively outweighed by any countervailing reason that either [the social216
planner] or [the person] has’. (See also my discussion in section 7.)217
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I disagree. There is a difference between embracing risk for oneself218
and for others. It is perfectly reasonable for a person to choose more219
conservatively for other people than these people would choose for220
themselves even assuming that the choices of these people would be221
ideally rational and fully informed. The justification for this is as follows.222
Good people tend to be more strongly emotionally affected when things223
go wrong and states actualize in which other people have to endure224
bad outcomes than when things go wrong and they themselves have to225
endure such bad outcomes. If they made the choices themselves they can226
accept these outcomes and take responsibility for them. They gambled227
and they lost. But it is harder for good people to shake off gambling and228
losing for someone else. This should make it permissible to choose more229
conservatively than the person in the prospect would have chosen. It is230
not obligatory to do so, but it is by no means unreasonable.231
Hence, the persons affected by the decisions of a social planner should232
accept that it is perfectly reasonable for a social planner to make more233
conservative decisions than they would have made for themselves. The234
social planner might say: ‘I fully understand that you would want to235
accept a particular risk. Furthermore, even if I were in your shoes, I might236
be equally willing to do so. But you have to understand that I cannot take237
such risks on your behalf – I cannot afford running the risk of having238
such bad outcomes happen on my watch.’ So the social planner may239
display an amount of risk aversion (expressed in the parameter αRAE) that240
is supplementary to the risk aversion of the persons in the prospect which241
is already expressed in the utility measures.242
Inter-state distribution243
The social planner considers the distribution over the goodness values244
of states in her own eyes. I stipulated that the social planner takes on at245
most one pro-poorly-off concern. Hence she does not have any intra-state246
distribution concerns and the goodness of state j is just the mean utility247
u. j = .5 u1j + .5 u2j. (We might say that u. j equals the EDEj -for αEDE = 0.)248
Again, we can proceed in the same way. The Risk-Absent State Equivalent249
(RASE) is the goodness of the prospect in the eyes of the social planner250
who is motivated by the inter-state distribution concern. The RASE of251
<u.1 = y, u.2 = z> is the value x such that the social planner would find252
<u.1 = x, u.2 = x> an equally good prospect as <u.1 = y, u.2 = z>. In the253
same way as before, I appeal to the χα function with αRASE as a measure254
of the strength of this concern characterizing the social planner. Hence,255
RASE = χαRASE (<u.1, u.2>).(2.6)
A social planner who is solely concerned about the inter-state distribution256
will order one prospect over another just in case the RASE of the former257
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exceeds the RASE of the latter.258
L∗  RASE L# ⇔ vRASE (L∗) ≥ vRASE (L#)(2.7)
with vRASE (L) = RASE
Clearly, this is an ex post evaluation.259
Inter-personal-prospect distribution260
The social planner considers the distribution over the goodness values of261
personal prospects. Since she has at most one pro-poorly-off concern, she262
does not have any intra-personal-prospect distribution concerns, and hence263
the goodness of the personal prospect of person i is just i’s expected utility264
E[ui.] = .5ui1 + .5ui2. (We might say that E[ui.] equals RAEi -for αRAE =265
0.) And again we can proceed in the same way. The Equally-Distributed266
Personal-Prospect Equivalent (EDPPE) is the goodness of the prospect in the267
eyes of the social planner who is motivated by the inter-personal-prospect268
distribution concern. The EDPPE of < E[u1.] = y, E[u2.] = z> is the value x269
such that the social planner would find <E[u1.] = x, E[u2.] = x> an equally270
good prospect as <E[u1.] = y, E[u2.] = z>. In the same way as before, I271
appeal to the χα function with αEDPPE as a measure of the strength of this272
concern characterizing the social planner. Hence,273
E DP P E = χαE DP P E (<E[u1.], E[u2.]>)(2.8)
A social planner who is solely concerned about the inter-personal-prospect274
distribution will order one prospect above another just in case the EDPPE275
of the former exceeds the EDPPE of the latter.276
L∗  E DP P E L# ⇔ vE DP P E (L∗) ≥ vE DP P E (L#)(2.9)
with vE DP P E (L) = E DP P E
Clearly, this is an ex ante evaluation.277
3. HARD CASES278
To see how these concerns fare, I introduce four prospects. I call them279
‘hard cases’ because they put these different concerns into a stark contrast.280
I assume once again that states are equiprobable. The value vUTIL of these281
prospects equals .5 and hence a utilitarian would be indifferent between282
them.283
• Equal Distribution. In this prospect, each person faces a certain284
personal prospect of utility .5.285
• Fair Lottery. In this prospect, a fair coinwill be tossed. If heads, person286
1 will end up with utility one and person 2 will end up with utility287
zero. If tails, person 1 will end up with utility zero and person 2288
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Equal Fair Lucky Favoured
Distribution Lottery State Person
.5 .5 0 1 1 0 1 1
.5 .5 1 0 1 0 0 0
TABLE 4. Hard cases.
with utility one. This is a lottery with prizes that are fully negatively289
correlated.290
• Lucky State. In this prospect, a fair coin will be tossed. If heads, then291
persons 1 and 2 will each end up with utility one. If tails, they will292
each end upwith utility zero. This is a lottery inwhich prizes are fully293
positively correlated. (It is not any less fair or any less of a lottery than294
Fair Lottery, but these names are just mnemonic aids.)295
• Favoured Person. In this prospect, person 1 faces a certain personal296
prospect of utility one and person 2 of utility zero.297
We can present these prospects by means of the matrices with persons in298
the rows and states in the columns in Table 4.299
Diamond (1967) presents Favoured Person and Fair Lottery. Chew and300
Sagi (2012) present all four cases, provide an interpretation, and rank Equal301
Distribution  Lucky State  Fair Lottery  Favoured Person:302
One can view these preferences as being concerned with the same type of303
example given by Diamond [(1967)], where a mother wishes to allocate a304
good between her two children, and is restricted to an average allocation of305
z/2 per child. The mother would most prefer to give each child z/2 for sure.306
If this cannot be achieved, then to avoid envy and the potential for conflict307
amongst the children, she would prefer that each child receives the same308
amount in each state ( . . . ) The least desirable allocation is the one in which309
one child is maximally favored for sure. (2012: 1518)310
The example is actually due to Machina (1989: 1643), who, like Diamond,311
only covers the comparison between Favoured Person and Fair Lottery.312
How do these hard cases square with the different concerns for the313
poorly off that a social planner may have? That is, in each hard case, which314
concerns are met and which are not?315
In Equal Distribution, all concerns are met. The utilities are well-316
distributed across persons within each state (intra-state distribution), the317
utilities are well-distributed across states for each person (intra-personal-318
prospect distribution), the mean utilities of states are well-distributed across319
states (inter-state distribution) and expected utilities are well-distributed320
across persons (inter-personal-prospect distribution).321
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Intra- Intra-Personal- Inter- Inter-Personal-
State Prospect State- Prospect
Concerns Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution
Parameter Cases αEDE αRAE αRASE αEDPPE
Equal Distribution Y Y Y Y
Fair Lottery N N Y Y
Lucky State Y N N Y
Favoured Person N Y Y N
TABLE 5. Concerns Met (Y) and not Met (N) in Hard Cases.
vEDE
Equal Distribution .5(.5.5 + .5.5)2 + .5(.5.5 + .5.5)2 .5
Fair Lottery .5(.50 + .51)2 + .5(.51 + .50)2 .25
Lucky State . 5(.51 + .51)2 + .5(.50 + .50)2 .5
Favoured Person . 5(.51 + .50)2 + .5(.51 + .50)2 .25
Ordering: Equal Distribution  Lucky State  Fair Lottery  Favoured Person
TABLE 6. Ordering of Hard Cases by a Social Planner Solely Concerned
with Intra-State Distribution.
In Fair Lottery, two concerns are met and two concerns are not322
met. The mean utilities of states are well-distributed across states323
(inter-state distribution) and the expected utilities are well-distributed324
across persons (inter-personal-prospect distribution). But the utilities are not325
well-distributed across persons within each state (intra-state distribution)326
and the utilities are not well-distributed across states for each person327
(intra-personal-prospect distribution).328
Observations in the same style can be made for Lucky State and329
Favoured Person. Our cases and concerns that are met and not met are330
summarized in Table 5.331
How does a social planner who is solely concerned with the intra-332
state distribution rank these hard cases? I have done the calculations with333
her degree of concern set at αEDE = 1/3 in Table 6. This result can be334
generalized: For any value of αEDE > 0 we obtain the same ordering.335
We can now calculate all value functions vEDE, vRAE, vRASE and336
vEDPPE with their respective α-parameters greater than 0 and construct337
the orderings for social planners who are solely concerned with338
respectively intra-state distribution, intra-personal-prospect distribution, inter-339
state distribution and inter-personal-prospect distribution. I have summarized340
the results in Table 7.341
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Concerns
Value function Orderings
Intra-State Distr Equal Distribution  Lucky State  Fair Lottery  Favoured Person
vEDE
Intra-P-P Distr Equal Distribution  Favoured Person  Fair Lottery  Lucky State
vRAE
Inter-State Distr Equal Distribution  Fair Lottery  Favoured Person  Lucky State
vRASE
Inter-P-P Distr Equal Distribution  Fair Lottery  Lucky State  Favoured Person
vEDPPE
TABLE 7. Orderings of Hard Cases by Social-Planners with Single
Concerns.
We can read the orderings that we obtain in Table 7 off of Table 5.342
For example, as we see in Table 5, the concern for intra-personal-prospect343
distribution is met in Equal Distribution and Favoured Person, but not in Fair344
Lottery and Lucky State. And indeed, as we see in Table 7, vRAE generates345
the ordering Equal Distribution  Favoured Person  Fair Lottery  Lucky346
State. Similar reasoning applies to the three other value functions.347
At this point, I can say something more about the interpretation of348
utilities in a prospect. We need to assume that there exists a welfare349
evaluation of outcomes, i.e. of actualizations of states for persons, from350
the perspective of the person in question within a given prospect. This351
evaluation need not be fully independent of the outcomes of other people352
or the outcomes in other states. First, there may be certain features of other353
people’s outcomes that affect a person’s assessment of her own welfare. If354
one person lives and everyone else dies, then the welfare of the survivor355
will need to take into account the loneliness that she will be facing. Or if356
there are huge inequalities, then also the rich will need to take into account357
the costs of social segregation. Second, there may be certain features of358
the outcomes in non-actualized states that affect a person’s welfare in the359
actualized state. If the outcomes in other states are violent death, then360
surviving in the actualized state may well be surviving with shell-shock.361
Depending on the outcomes in other states, the outcome in the actualized362
state may include regret and rejoicing. All these features enter into the363
utility of a person in a state, as expressed in the prospect.364
What the social planner brings to the evaluation is a risk aversion365
and inequality aversion that comes with decision-making for others.366
This type of risk aversion and inequality aversion needs to be bracketed367
from the welfare assessments that enter into the utility values in the368
prospect, since otherwise we would be counting the social planner’s369
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preferences twice. For example, in Chew and Sagi’s story of the mother370
and the children (2012), the utility values for the children cannot371
take into account a child’s prospective empathy with the mother’s ill372
feelings on grounds of having lost a gamble for the child or having373
placed the child in a situation of inequality. The assumption is that374
it is possible to specify welfare values that do precisely bracket such375
prospective empathy from the people in the prospect towards the social376
planner.377
4. AN ALL THINGS CONSIDERED METHOD378
We have modelled social planners who display single pro-poorly-off379
concerns. Now we need to add some complexity. First, the social planner380
may display any combination of concerns: She may care about all four381
concerns; She may care about some subset; and there are gradations –382
e.g. she may care much about one concern, minimally about a second383
and not at all about the other two. Furthermore, we can generalize the384
method for any number of persons, any number of states, and any vector385
of probability weights.386
What determines the relative weights of the social planner’s concerns?387
There may be objective and subjective factors. As for objective factors:388
Once we give actual content to these prospects, certain concerns may389
be more or less morally salient in the evaluation. Information about390
levels of well-being is not enough to determine what concerns should391
be more and less weighty. I will take up this issue in section 6. As392
for subjective factors: We can leave some room for cultural or personal393
preferences in the relative weights that these concerns carry in particular394
situations.395
So how do we proceed from here? What we have learned is that in396
the evaluation of prospects, there are four distributional concerns a social397
planner might care about. What we would like to do is to construct an398
all things considered value function that rests on four parameters – each399
parameter corresponding to one of these concerns with larger parameter400
values indicating greater concern.401
How can we do this? I first distinguish between an ex post social402
planner and an ex ante social planner.403
An ex post social planner first calculates the goodness of states and404
then proceeds to calculate the goodness of the prospect by amalgamating405
over the goodness of states. She may have two concerns, viz. concerns for406
the poorly off in the intra-state distribution and in the inter-state distribution.407
In our earlier discussion of the social planner who cares solely about408
inter-state distribution, we assumed that the goodness of a state j in her409
eyes is simply the mean utility u. j . But if she also cares about intra-state410
distribution, then the goodness of a state in her eyes is the EDEj. Hence we411
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need to calculate the Risk-Absent State Equivalent (RASE) with the EDEjs412
rather than with the u.js as arguments. So for an ex post social planner:413
L∗  expost L# ⇔ vexpost(L∗) ≥ vexpost(L#)(4.1)
with vexpost (L) = RASE (<E DE1, E DE2>)
An ex ante social planner first calculates the goodness of personal414
prospects and then proceeds to calculate the goodness of the prospect by415
amalgamating over the goodness of personal prospects. She may have416
two concerns, viz. concerns about the poorly off in the intra-personal-417
prospect distribution and in the inter-personal-prospect distribution. In our418
earlier discussion of the social planner who cares solely about inter-419
personal-prospect distribution, we assumed that the goodness for a person420
i in the social planner’s eyes is simply the expected utility E[ui.]. But if421
the social planner also cares about intra-personal-prospect distribution, then422
the goodness for a person in the social planner’s eyes is the RAEi. Hence423
we need to calculate the Equal-Distributed Personal-Prospect Equivalent424
(EDPPE) with the RAEis rather than the E[ui.]s as arguments. So for an425
ex ante social planner:426
L∗  exante L# ⇔ vexante (L∗) = vexante (L#)(4.2)
with vexante (L) = E DP P E (<RAE1, RAE2>)
How should we think about the relationship between ex ante and ex post427
calculations? One way to think about this is that one should evaluate428
prospects either ex ante or ex post – but the two methods of evaluation429
should not be mixed. There are two such non-mixing positions. There430
is the stronger position which states that there is at most one method of431
evaluation which is correct for all sets of prospects. Or there is the weaker432
position which states that, for any particular set of prospects, at most one433
method of evaluation can be correct – but different methods can be fitting434
for different sets of prospects.435
I disagree with any of these non-mixing positions. I want to propose436
a more ecumenical approach. Social planners may well be characterized437
by multiple concerns. The respective strengths of the two ex post concerns438
are captured by αEDE and αRASE. The respective strengths of the two ex439
ante concerns are captured by αRAE and αEDPPE. Let the all things considered440
(ATC) value of a prospect in the eyes of a social planner be a weighted441
sum of her ex post and ex ante evaluations:442
L∗  ATC L# ⇔ vATC (L∗) ≥ vATC (L#)(4.3)
with vatc (L) = ϑvexpost (L) + (1 − ϑ) vexante (L) .
How should we set the weighting parameter ϑ? One response is that the443
ϑ-parameter reflects the social planner’s disposition to evaluate prospects444
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on ex post grounds rather than ex ante grounds and that this disposition445
is sui generis, i.e. it is not determined by the strength of her respective446
concerns. A social planner may display any mix of both dispositions.447
The ϑ-parameter then needs to be specified independently of the α-448
parameters.449
Another response is that the ϑ-parameter is determined by the relative450
strength of the social planner’s ex post concerns in the total set of ex post451
and ex ante concerns. We could then define ϑ as follows. If at least one of452
αEDE, αRAE, αRASE, or αEDPPE > 0, then453
ϑ = αE DE + αRASE
αE DE + αRASE + αRAE + αE DP P E(4.4)
and ϑ may take any value in [0,1] otherwise.4454
My own sympathy is with the latter response. I do not see how a social455
planner could care greatly about, say, ex post concerns, but not give any456
weight to an ex post evaluation of the prospect. The extent to which a social457
planner gives more or less weight to the ex post evaluation than to the ex458
ante evaluation is determined by the relative strength of the parameters.459
Sowe can nowmove from the social planner’s concerns to an ordering460
over the prospects. The social planner registers the strength of her various461
pro-poorly-off concerns and the value function vATC(L) will determine an462
ordering over prospects. This can be done for prospects with multiple463
people, multiple states, and any probability distribution defined over464
states.465
But we can also turn around this direction. We can provide the social466
planner with a set of prospects and ask her to construct an ordering over467
these prospects. Subsequently we represent the ordering over the set of468
prospects as a set of equalities and inequalities between the values of each469
prospect as defined by the value function vATC following (4.3) and (4.4).470
E.g. L1  L2  L3 is represented as vATC(L1) > vATC(L2) = vATC(L3). vATC is471
a four-parameter value function. We then determine what combinations472
of parameter values <αEDE, αRASE, αRAE, αEDPPE> can generate these473
equalities and inequalities.474
For some rankings, there may not be any such combination. That is,475
no set of concerns for the poorly-off could generate such rankings. To take476
a simple case, no set of parameter values could yield a ranking with a477
sure prospect (e.g. Equal Distribution) in which everyone is better off being478
ranked below a sure prospect in which everyone is worse off.479
For other rankings, there may be multiple combinations of parameter480
values contained in a subset of the four-dimensional space [0, 1)4.481
These combinations characterize the range of concerns of the social482
4 If αEDE = αRAE = αRASE = αEDPPE = 0, then vATC = vUTIL and hence ϑ may take any value
in [0, 1] since the ex post and the ex ante evaluations yield the same ranking on vUTIL.
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planner that may generate her ordering over the prospects. Mathematical483
computation programs can be invoked in a standard way to determine484
what combinations of parameter values yield particular rankings. For485
example, in Mathematica, we can fix the value of the fourth parameter and486
display the admissible remaining parameter values graphically by means487
of the function RegionPlot3D.488
Alternatively, one could use the technique in an anthropological vein.489
Different cultures may order risky prospects differently and one could use490
the technique as a characterization of the constraints on the risk attitudes491
that are prevalent in the culture.492
The social planner can move back and forth between her parameter493
assessments and her orderings. She may self-identify as caring more or494
less about certain distributional features while her orderings of prospects495
may not reflect this self-assessment. When noticing such inconsistencies,496
she can strive for coherence either by correcting her self-assessment of497
what distributional features she cares about or by correcting her orderings.498
The technique is a standard application of reflective equilibrium.499
We move from general principles to judgements about particular cases500
and from judgements about particular cases back to the principles501
that cover them. We try to make our principles coherent with our502
judgements by making adjustments on both ends. In our case the general503
principles are the pro-poorly-off concerns and the judgements in the504
particular cases are the orderings over prospects. The only difference505
with standard reflective equilibrium reasoning is that the exercise requires506
computational techniques to implement.507
I propose to call this approach to ranking risky prospects the508
‘Distribution View’. It is a view which permits the social planner to bring509
various distributional concerns to the task and it is not dogmatic in510
favouring one set of concerns or its concomitant ranking over another.511
5. SEPARABILITY512
Diamond’s seminal article (1967), discussed in Sen (1970: 143–6), ends513
with the line: ‘I amwilling to accept the sure-thing principle for individual514
choice but not for social choice, since it seems reasonable for the individual515
to be concerned solely with final states while society is also interested in516
the process of choice.’ (1967: 766) In other words, he is willing to accept517
Separability of States for single-person prospects, but not Separability518
of States for multiple-person prospects. Let us see how this fits in with519
our analysis.520
The argument for Separability of States for multiple-persons521
prospects runs as follows. Consider Table 8. Within each pair, it makes522
no difference to Person 1 or Person 2 whether Prospect 1 or Prospect 2523
is implemented if State 2 actualizes. It does make a difference to Person524
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Pair 1 Pair 2
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 1 Prospect 2
1 0  0 0 iff 1 1  0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
TABLE 8. Separability of States for Two-Person Prospects.
Pair 1 Pair 2
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 1 Prospect 2
1/2 1 0  1/2+ ε 1 – tε 0 iff 1/2 1 3/4  1/2 + ε 1 – tε 3/4
TABLE 9. Separability of States for Single-Person Prospects.
1 and Person 2 if State 1 actualizes. Furthermore, if we just attend to525
State 1, Person 1 and Person 2 are affected in the same way by the choices526
in Pair 1 and Pair 2. Hence, since the persons are affected by the choices in527
the same way if State 1 actualizes and since State 2 makes no difference,528
the social planner should respect Separability of States, i.e. Prospect 1 is529
weakly preferred to Prospect 2 in Pair 1 just in case Prospect 1 is weakly530
preferred to Prospect 2 in Pair 2.531
Diamond rejects Separability of States for multiple-person prospects532
because the social planner is also ‘interested in the process of choice’.533
Prospect 1 of Pair 1 and Prospect 2 of Pair 2 is our Fair Lottery. Prospect 2 in534
Pair 1 and Prospect 1 in Pair 2 is our Favoured Person. If the social planner535
prefers the allocation of a benefit by means of a fair lottery rather than536
by means of simply assigning it to a favoured person then she violates537
Separability of States. Shewill do so if she is sensitive to the inter-personal-538
prospect distribution. This is essentially Diamond’s point expressed in our539
framework.540
The social planner will also violate Separability of States if she is541
sensitive to the intra-personal-prospect distribution. In that case she will542
strictly prefer Prospect 2 in Pair 1 and Prospect 1 in Pair 2.543
Diamond does not object to Separability of States for single-person544
prospects. So let us see how plausible this principle is. Consider Table 9. In545
each prospect, there are three equiprobable states. In each pair, Prospect 2546
offers a leaky transfer which is a kind of insurance policy on the outcome547
in State 1 at some cost to the outcome in State 2. Prospect 2 offers a little548
something extra (viz. ε) if State 1 actualizes, but at the cost of tε if State549
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Pair 1 Pair 2
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 1 Prospect 2
1 0  0 1 iff 1 0  0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
TABLE 10. Separability of Persons for Risky Prospects.
2 actualizes with t > 1. Furthermore, t and ε are sufficiently small so that550
1 – tε > ¾ > 1/2 + ε. In Pair 1 State 3 offers a fixed 0 whereas in Pair 2 it551
offers a fixed 3/4.552
With Diamond, we might say that the third state ought to be553
irrelevant to the choices of the social planner since the utility in this554
third state within each pair is fixed. If the social planner believes that555
a leaky transfer improves the prospect in Pair 1 then she should also556
believe that it improves the prospect in Pair 2 and vice versa. The social557
planner should respect Separability of States in single-person prospects.558
Now this position is not uncontroversial and we will critically assess it559
below.560
Before doing so, I would like to show that a parallel argument561
can plausibly be made for the Separability of Persons. We start with562
a violation of Separability of Persons in two-person risky prospects.563
Consider Table 10 with two pairs of prospects. Within each pair, Person564
2 is unaffected. If we just attend to person 1, the social planner faces the565
same choices in Pair 1 and Pair 2. Then Separability of Persons requires566
that the Social Planner should weakly prefer Prospect 1 to Prospect 2567
in Pair 1 just in case she weakly prefers Prospect 1 to Prospect 2 in568
Pair 2.569
Our framework permits violations of this Separability of Persons.570
If we are sensitive to the intra-state distribution we prefer Prospect 1 to571
Prospect 2 in Pair 1, but Prospect 2 to Prospect 1 in Pair 2 (i.e. we prefer572
Lucky State to Fair Lottery).5 If we are sensitive to the inter-state distribution573
we will prefer Prospect 2 to Prospect 1 in Pair 1, but Prospect 1 to Prospect574
2 in Pair 2 (i.e. we prefer Fair Lottery to Lucky State).575
5 Adler (2012: 523) points out that ‘EU Prioritarianism with the Fleurbaey Transform ( . . . )
fails to satisfyweak ex ante separability’. EU Prioritiarianismwith the Fleurbaey Transform
is tantamount to a ranking that is sensitive to the intra-state distribution in our framework
with the value of each state measured by Fleurbaey’s EDE. Weak ex ante separability is
tantamount to our Separability of Persons, with the added stipulation that the person who
is unaffected within each pair is facing a certain outcome. Adler shows that sensitivity to
the intra-state distribution, measured through the EDE, fails to respect even this weaker
condition.
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Pair 1 Pair 2
Prospect 1 Prospect 2 Prospect 1 Prospect 2
½  ½ + ε iff 1/2  ½ + ε
1 1 – tε 1 1 – tε
0 0 3/4 3/4
TABLE 11. Separability of Persons for a Certain Prospect.
Compare this to Separability of Persons for a certain three-person576
prospect in Table 11. Parallel to Diamond’s position on the Separability of577
States for single-person prospects, wemight say that Person 3 is irrelevant578
to the choices of the social planner, since his utility within each pair is579
fixed. Person 3 is unaffected by the choice of the social planner and hence580
there is no reason for the social planner to let Person 3’s utility make a581
difference to her choice.582
This is the position that underlies our model: Separability of States583
and Persons may be violated for two-person risky prospects; This is584
entirely consistent with requiring Separability of States for Single-585
Person Prospects and Separability of Persons for Certain Prospects.586
The transform that we invoked in (2.1) respects Separability of States587
for Single-Person Prospects and Separability of Persons for Certain588
Prospects and hence it matches Diamond’s position on the Separability of589
States and our adaptation of this position to the Separability of Persons.590
Sensitivities to various aspects of the distribution in multiple-person risky591
prospects may violate Separability of States and Persons for multiple-592
person risky prospects.593
However, we have set up our Single-Person Prospect choices and our594
Certain Prospect choices so that we open up the way for a critical stance.595
Let us start with the Separability of Persons.596
In Table 11, for certain values of t and ε, the social planner might say:597
I am willing to endorse the leaky transfer in Pair 2, since the benefit goes598
to the worst off person and this justifies the loss of average utility. But I599
am not willing to do so in Pair 1, since to justify the loss of average utility600
there should be a benefit to the worst off and the worst off person does601
not get any benefit in this case.602
We canmake a similar argument for Table 9. For certain values of t and603
ε, the social planner might say: I am willing to endorse the leaky transfer604
in Pair 2, since the leaky transfer provides a kind of insurance for when the605
worst outcome would come to pass and this justifies the loss of expected606
utility. But I am not willing to do so in Pair 1, since to justify the loss of607
expected utility, I would like to see that the worst outcome be insured, not608
the second best outcome.609
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Again, we wish to be ecumenical about this kind of concern. If610
the social planner displays such sensitivities, violating Separability of611
Persons for Certain Prospects and Separability of States for Single-Person612
Prospects, wewish to respect this and incorporate these sensitivities in our613
model. How can we do so?614
Let us start with sensitivities violating Separability of Persons for615
certain prospects. Donaldson andWeymark (1980: 74) define the following616
single-parameter Gini family which yields an equally distributed617
equivalent that is rank-order sensitive:618
ξδ(<u1, . . . ,un>) =
∑n
i=1[i
δ − (i − 1)δ]u˜i
nδ
(5.1)
with < u˜1, . . . , u˜n> being a reordering of the utilities in <u1, . . . , un> so619
that u˜1 ≥ . . . ≥ u˜n. Now δ ∈ [1,) measures the rank-order sensitivity620
to the intra-state distribution. For δ = 1, the value of the function is621
the expectation of the prospect; as δ → , the value of the function622
approaches the lowest utility u˜n; and the function is monotonically623
decreasing. This function is rank-order sensitive. The rank-order of the624
utilities between which there is a leaky transfer changes from Pair 1 to625
Pair 2 in Table 11. It is indeed possible to set the parameters of δ, ε and t626
so that Prospect 2 is strictly preferred in Pair 2, but Prospect 1 is strictly627
preferred in Pair 1, violating the Separability of Persons. For example, the628
values t = 4 and ε = .04 and δ = 2 yield such a reversal.629
So if the social planner displays rank-order sensitivities for certain630
prospects, then we can calculate the EDEjs by means of the function631
ξ δ . (For consistency and for computational purposes we would actually632
substitute ‘1/(1− δ)’ for ‘δ’ in ξ δ in (5.1) so that δ ∈ [0, 1).) She may633
also display such sensitivities in determining the value of a prospect634
on grounds of the values of individual prospects, i.e. in calculating the635
EDPPE. Again we can invoke the function ξ δ .636
Now we can make exactly the same move for Separability of States637
for single-person prospects. If the social planner displays rank-order638
sensitivities in determining the value of single-person prospects, then we639
calculate the RAEis by means of the function ξ δ . If she displays rank-640
order sensitivities in determining the value of the prospect on grounds641
of the values of the states, i.e. in calculating the RASE, we can invoke the642
function ξ δ .6643
6 We restrict ourselves here to equiprobable probability distributions. If we have unequal
probability weights we proceed in the same way as we would when calculating the ξδ
on the basis of average utility values for groups of persons in a federation and weights
proportional to group sizes. That is, we simply calculate the ξδ for the smallest federation
of persons who can be partitioned in groups in which each person has the same utility
(viz. the average utility of the matching group in the federation) and the groups have the
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Are rank-order sensitivities irrational in determining the EDEjs or the644
EDPPE? Are they irrational in determining the RAEis and the RASE? One645
might object that they are rational for the EDEjs and the EDPPE, but not646
for the RAEis and RASE. The argument is that, at the end of the day,647
multiple real people will actually end up with allocations of utility values,648
but only one state will be realized and the others are water under the649
bridge. I do not see this. The social planner’s argument that she preferred650
to see leaky transfers benefit the worst off persons did not seem any more651
convincing to me than that she preferred to see leaky transfer provide an652
insurance for the worst outcomes that may actualize.653
However, if one disagrees with this, I would have no qualms. Our654
model permits us to assign either separable or rank-order sensitivities655
for any of the distributions to the social planner to generate orderings.656
Or when moving in the direction from orderings to sensitivities we657
can determine the set of separable and rank-order sensitivities that can658
generate such orderings. In each case, the model can be adapted to one’s659
views about rationality. Or, alternatively, wemay also bracket the question660
of rationality and take a behavioural stand.661
6. APPLICATIONS662
I will now show how my theoretical framework can be used to cast light663
on some actual policy questions and on the debate on Prioritarianism in664
moral philosophy. For more discussion of how different distributional665
concerns have more or less weight depending on the context of666
application of risky prospects, see Bovens (2015).667
a. Unequal expectations and survival rates. Ubel et al. (1996)668
confronted prospective jurors, medical ethicists and experts in decision-669
making with the following choice. There are two tests for colon cancer –670
one is more expensive but highly effective, the other one is cheaper but671
less effective. The tests will be administered to a low-risk population. The672
cheap test can be administered to everyone. The expensive test can be673
administered to only half of the population whowill be chosen at random.674
We may reasonably expect that the more expensive test will prevent 1100675
deaths and that the cheaper test will prevent 1000 deaths in the population676
at large. Results of the experiment were as follows: Prospective jurors and677
medical ethicists were more inclined to favour the cheaper test, whereas678
the experts in decision-making were more inclined to favour the more679
expensive test.680
The typical prospective juror andmedical ethicist are concerned about681
the inter-personal-prospect distribution. On the cheap test, there is equality682
same proportional sizes as in the actual federation. The procedure for non-equiprobable
probability distributions is analogous whilst rounding for real numbers.
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throughout in the expectations. On the more expensive test, once the683
random device has determined the allocation, there is inequality in the684
expectations. Subjects who favour the cheaper tests are subjects who685
are concerned about the poorly off relative to the inter-personal-prospect686
distribution. And indeed, we can model these subjects by setting αEDPPE687
sufficiently high and setting all other parameters at 0. This will yield an688
ordering that ranks the cheaper test over the expensive test.689
To connect this to our earlier discussion, let us revisit the social690
planner who is solely concernedwith the inter-personal-prospect distribution691
and hence adopts the value function vEDPPE. This social planner orders692
Fair Lottery above Favoured Person. And this is indeed the distinction that693
is at work here. On the more expensive test, once the random device694
has determined the allocation, there are favoured people, whereas on695
the cheaper test, the lottery of who will die and who will live leaves696
expectations equal throughout.697
There are two readings of our typical experts in decision-making. On698
one reading, these experts are not sensitive (or not sufficiently sensitive)699
to the poorly off in the inter-personal-prospect distribution and simply prefer700
the policy that provides the highest expected survival rate, even if the701
greater risk is focused on those persons who were so unlucky not to702
receive the test. On the other reading, these experts do care about the inter-703
personal-prospect distribution, but, they would say, one should evaluate704
prospects prior to the time when the random device was set in motion.705
At that point there were no inequalities in the expectations – the more706
expensive test simply provided a greater fatality chance reduction to all707
than the cheaper test.708
To distinguish between both interpretations, one might envision a709
case in which the more expensive test can only be administered to say,710
the urban population, but not to the rural population, whereas the cheaper711
test can be administered to the whole population. I expect that our experts712
in decision-making who previously favoured the more expensive test713
would now be split. Those who fit the former reading would continue714
to favour the more expensive test, whereas those who fit the latter reading715
would now shift and favour the cheaper test.716
In a democratic society, a policy maker should be sensitive to the fact717
that some people are willing to allow somewhat greater fatality rates in718
order to have a policy that preserves equality in expectations. And it is not719
sufficient that such equality is warranted by a random device, since, after720
the random device has been consulted, there is inequity in the system.721
Some people prefer a process that does not introduce inequities at any722
time, not even by invoking random devices. What constitutes a reasonable723
trade-off between equity and a higher survival rate cannot be decided724
once and for all: It will be dependent on the local culture and on the725
particular issue at hand.726
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LNRS S1 S2 S3
P1 1 1 0
P-2 1 0 1
P3 0 1 1
TABLE 12. No Routine Screening.
LRS S1 S2 S3
P1 2/3–ε 2/3–ε 2/3–ε
P2 2/3–ε 2/3–ε 2/3–ε
P3 2/3–ε 2/3–ε 2/3–ε
TABLE 13. Routine Screening.
b. Ex ante pareto and ex post inequalities. In ‘Decide as you would727
with full information! An argument against ex ante Pareto’, Fleurbaey728
and Voorhoeve (2013) compare a Routine Screening policy with a No729
Routine Screening policy for breast cancer. No Routine Screening simply730
involves less frequent screening than Routine Screening. Routine Screening731
slightly reduces the expected fatality rates from breast cancer but it732
does come at the cost of continual interference with women’s lives:733
There are psychological and physical harms caused by the tests and734
by the worries that come with false positives. The US Preventive735
Services Task Force in 2009 decided that the expected costs of routine736
screening actually outweighed the benefits by a small margin and they737
recommended against it. Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve object to the Task738
Force’s recommendation.739
To see how Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve’s reasoning plays out within my740
framework, let us stylize the case. Suppose that there are three persons741
and three equiprobable states of the world. With No Routine Screening,742
precisely one person will die in each state. With Routine Screening, nobody743
will die, but a cost of (1/3 + ε) is imposed on survivors for small ε. Then744
we can represent both policies Tables 12 and 13.745
Suppose that the social planner is concerned solely about the poorly746
off in the intra-state distribution – say, we set the αEDE at 1/3. Then the EDEj747
equals 2/3–ε in Routine Screening and (1/31+ 1/31+1/30)2 = 4/9 in748
No Routine Screening in each state j. Hence the vEDE of Routine Screening (i.e.749
2/3–ε) exceeds the vEDE of Routine Screening (i.e. 4/9). So a social planner750
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who is single-mindedly concerned about the poorly off in the intra-state751
distribution will prefer Routine Screening to No Routine Screening.7752
Suppose that the social planner is unconcerned about the poorly off753
in any form or shape. In this case, we calculate vUTIL of both prospects754
which equals 2/3 on No Routine Screening and 2/3–ε on Routine Screening755
and so No Routine Screening will come to be preferred. The Task Force’s756
recommendation squares with this recommendation.757
There is a certain draw to Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve’s position. As758
the title of their article suggests, we should decide as we would with full759
information. No matter what state actualizes, the social planner may prefer760
the more equal distribution in Routine Screening to a state in which there761
are casualties, as in No Routine Screening. Hence, she should prefer Routine762
Screening to No-Routine-Screening. This is a reasonable position even if all763
prefer No Routine Screening on grounds of their greater expectations.764
However, let us change the interpretation of these prospects. Suppose765
that we are deciding on a Lenient Alcohol Policy or a Strict Alcohol Policy.766
On Lenient Alcohol Policy, non-problem-drinkers can enjoy their pint at a767
reasonable price, but there are casualties of alcoholism. On Strict Alcohol768
Policy, we avoid these casualties, but at the cost of interfering with the769
pleasures of non-problem-drinkers. Lenient Alcohol Policy can then be770
stylized by the No-Routine-Screening matrix in Table 12 and the Strict771
Alcohol Policy can be stylized by the Routine-Screening matrix in Table 13.772
In all these cases, there is a conflict in policy making between ex773
ante Pareto and an ex post concern for the poorly off in the intra-state-774
distribution. Ex ante Paretowill rank prospect LNRS above LRS because each775
person i’s expectation on LNRS (viz. 2/3) is greater than i’s expectation on776
LRS (viz. 2/3–ε). A social planner with an ex post concern for the poorly777
off in the intra-state-distribution will rank LRS above LNRS, because for all778
states j = 1, 2, 3, she prefers Sj on LRS to Sj on LNRS, due to the fact that779
some people are poorly off in Sj on LNRS and not on LRS.780
My intuitions on whether a social planner should prefer Routine781
Screening to No-Routine Screening are less clear than Fleurbaey and782
Voorhoeve’s. I am not sure that we should just overrule ex ante Pareto783
in the breast cancer screening case. I tend to be more ecumenical in this784
matter. Indeed, I can see that a person might be so motivated, but I can785
equally understand someone who feels a greater pull from the direction786
of the ex ante Pareto.787
But suppose that we grant Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve’s judgement in788
the breast cancer screening case. Then I still remain unconvinced that we789
should also favour a strict policy on alcohol. In the case of alcohol policy,790
7 More precisely, for any permissible value of ε there exists a threshold value of αEDE such
that the social planner weakly prefers Routine Screening to No Routine Screening just in case
her αEDE is greater than or equal to this threshold value.
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I am more inclined to respect ex ante Pareto and favour Lenient Alcohol791
Policy.792
So what is the difference between these cases? Why am I less willing793
to overrule the unanimous judgement of the persons in the prospect in794
the alcohol policy case than in the screening case? The formal structure of795
these problems hides certain features that are relevant to moral decision-796
making. Here is one such difference. In the case of screening for breast797
cancer, the probabilities are determined by the lottery of one’s body or of798
the environment. But in the case of alcoholism, it may be true that 1/3 will799
become alcoholics on Lenient Alcohol Policy, but there is still an element of800
choice and responsibility that enters into the route towards alcoholism.801
This is the reason why I am less willing to overrule ex ante Pareto. People802
who succumb to breast cancer do so due to no fault of their own and hence803
health inequalities in the ex post calculus carry more weight. But people804
who are alcoholics typically carry at least some responsibility for their805
predicament and hence health inequalities in the ex post calculus carry less806
weight – and, in particular, they do not carry enoughweight to counter the807
unanimous strict preference for Lenient Alcohol Policy.8808
7. THE PRIORITY VIEW809
On Parfit’s ‘Priority View’ or Prioritarianism, it is better to provide a810
slightly smaller benefit to a person at a lower level of utility rather811
than a slightly greater benefit to a person at a higher level of utility.812
Parfit (1997) defends his view initially in the context of decision-making813
under certainty. But how does this view fare in the context of uncertain814
prospects? Rabinowicz (2002) has a proposal for a Prioritarian evaluation815
of uncertain prospects. Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009) claim to have816
decisive objections to Prioritarianism within the context of uncertain817
prospects. In response to Otsuka and Voorhoeve, Parfit (2012) spells out818
what he takes Prioritarianism to be committed to in this context. I will819
taxonomize and cast light on their respective positions by incorporating820
them in my approach.821
Let us first turn to Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009). They compare the822
following range of cases:823
Comparison (i). Alice may either end up at a low level of utility or at a824
high level of utility depending on a flip of a fair coin.825
8 One may of course disagree with the empirical facts and point to environmental and
genetic factors that causally determine alcoholism. That is fair enough and I would not
take issue with this. But once we do this, then I submit that our judgements on Routine
Screening and Strict Alcohol Policy will come to align.
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1+δ 0 (i) 1 0+ε
 OV;  P,R
1+δ 1+δ (ii) 1 1
0 0  OV,P,R 0+ε 0+ε
1+δ 0 (iii) 1 0+ε
1+δ 0  OV;  P,R 1 0+ε
1+δ 0 (iv) 1 0+ε
0 1+δ  OV,P,R 0+ε 1
TABLE 14. Comparisons by Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009), Parfit
(2012) and Rabinowicz (2001).
A social planner9 has to decide between providing a826
slightly smaller benefit if she ends up poorly off or a827
slightly greater benefit if she ends up well off.828
Comparison (ii). A social planner has to decide between providing a829
slightly greater benefit to Alice who is at a high level of830
utility rather than a slightly smaller benefit to Bob who831
is at a low level of utility.832
Comparison (iii). Both Alice and Bob may either both end up at a low833
level of utility or both end up at a high level of utility,834
depending on the flip of a fair coin. A social planner has835
to decide between providing a slightly smaller benefit836
if they end up poorly off or a slightly greater benefit if837
they end up well off.838
Comparison (iv). Both Alice and Bob may either end up at a low level839
of utility or at a high level of utility depending on840
the flip of a fair coin and these chances are perfectly841
anti-correlated. A social planner has to decide between842
providing a slightly smaller benefit to the person who843
ends up poorly off (whoever it may be) or a slightly844
greater benefit to the person who ends up well off845
(whoever it may be).846
I have presented these comparisons in Table 14. The size of a benefit is847
the size of the utility difference to the beneficiary. δ is the utility difference848
that Otsuka and Voorhoeve’s ‘slightly greater benefit’ makes and ε is the849
utility difference that their ‘slightly smaller benefit’ makes. Alice takes up850
the top row and Bob the bottom row. States are equiprobable.851
9 Otsuka and Voorhoeve actually have the choice made by a ‘morally motivated stranger’.
Clearly we can conceive of the social planner as being morally motivated, i.e. she conceives
of the exercise as a normative exercise, and as a stranger, i.e. none of the parties affected
stand in a special relationship to her.
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(1+δ)/2 (1+δ)/2
(1+δ)/2 (1+δ)/2
TABLE 15. Certain Prospect.
Otsuka and Voorhoeve grant that the social planner should provide852
the smaller benefit in comparison (ii). However, she has ‘strong reason’853
(Otsuka 2015: 5) not do so in comparison (i), as I indicated in section854
2. She should not provide the smaller benefit in comparison (i) because855
the utility information embedded in the specification of the size of the856
benefits reflects the ideally rational and self-interested preferences of857
the beneficiary and the social planner should respect these preferences.858
Furthermore, she should provide the greater benefit in (iii), since this is859
just a variation on (i) in which the number of people is doubled. Finally, in860
case (iv) she should provide the smaller benefit as well since she ‘should861
show appropriate concern for all those who, simply due to brute bad luck,862
will end up worse than others’ (Otsuka and Voorhoeve 2009: 197).863
In his response to Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009), Parfit (2012) agrees864
with their judgements in cases (ii) and (iv), but not in cases (i) and (iii).865
He believes that the social planner should provide the smaller benefit to866
the poorly off in cases (i) and (iii) as well (2012: 405, 408). She should867
overrule the judgement(s) of the person(s) in the prospect and make sure868
that the smaller benefit goes to the poorly off person if the state containing869
the poorly off person or persons were to actualize.870
Rabinowicz (2002) provides the following value function for871
Prioritarianism. To determine the value of a prospect, we construct strictly872
concave and increasing utility transforms ϕ of each entry in the prospect,873
sum the utility transforms for each state to calculate the social utility of874
the state and then construct the expectation of the social utility of a state.875
Hence, in a two-person prospect with equiprobable states:876
vRAB (L) =
2∑
j=1
p j
2∑
i=1
ϕ(ui j ) =
2∑
j=1
.5
2∑
i=1
ϕ(ui j )(7.1)
This value function generates rankings that coincide with Parfit’s rankings877
in comparisons (i) through (iv).878
Now consider the prospects in the left column of Table 14 on rows879
(ii), (iii) and (iv). Add to this a fourth prospect, viz. the certain prospect880
in which both Alice and Bob receive (1+δ)/2, as represented in Table 15.881
I stipulated that utilities are measured on a ratio-scale. Hence we can882
construct transforms bymultiplying these prospects by 1/(1+δ). Note that883
the transform of the prospect in the left column of row (ii) is Favoured884
Person, of row (iii) is Lucky State, of row (iv) is Fair Lottery, and of our fourth885
28 LUC BOVENS
prospect in Table 15 is Equal Distribution. How do Otsuka and Voorhoeve,886
Parfit and Rabinowicz rank these prospects?887
Rabinowicz’s ranking is straightforward. We apply the value function888
vRAB which generates the ranking Equal Distribution  Lucky State  Fair889
Lottery  Favoured Person.890
Otsuka and Voorhoeve and Parfit require more interpretation. Let us891
start with Otsuka and Voorhoeve’s rankings:892
(a) Equal Distribution and Lucky State. Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009)893
believe that the social planner has strong reason to respect the strict894
preferences of Alice and Bob in comparison (iii). Similarly, she should895
respect the indifference of Alice and Bob between (1+δ)/2 for sure or a896
50–50 chance (1+δ) and 0. Hence Otsuka and Voorhoeve are indifferent897
between Equal Distribution and Lucky State.898
(b) Lucky State and Fair Lottery. Otsuka and Voorhoeve rank Lucky State899
over Fair Lottery: In their discussion of anti-correlated risk, i.e. in Fair900
Lottery cases, they call upon our concern for ‘the legitimate claims of that901
half of the group who will, ex post, due to bad brute luck, end up very902
badly off and worse off than others’ (2009: 197 emphasis added), underlining903
the badness of this prospect. In Lucky State, nobody will be worse off than904
others.905
(c) Fair Lottery and Favoured Person. Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009) do906
not make any pronouncement on a ranking over Fair Lottery and Favoured907
Person. So we need to look in some of their other writings. Otsuka (2012)908
ranks Fair Lottery strictly above Favoured Person and examines what could909
ground such a ranking. Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey (2012) propose a strict910
ranking of Fair Lottery  Favoured Person based on fairness and as a911
means to respect the separateness of persons.10 In a single-authored piece,912
Fleurbaey (2010: 654, 675) provides an axiomatic justification for, in my913
terminology, a single parameter value function with vEDE, on which, as914
we saw in Table 7, Fair Lottery  Favoured Person. He tentatively argues915
that the fact that an outcome came about due to a lottery should be916
incorporated into the utility values. So let us settle for the weak claim that917
for Fleurbaey, Otsuka and Voorhoeve, Fair Lottery  Favoured Person.918
We turn to Parfit’s rankings:919
(a) Equal Distribution and Lucky State. A Prioritarian social planner920
should prefer Equal Distribution to Lucky State. To see this, suppose that921
both Alice and Bob’s individual prospects were <(1+δ)/2; 0>. We can922
now either provide Alice and Bob with benefits of (1+δ)/2 each if they923
10 Note that the separateness of persons as discussed in Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey (2012) is not
to be confused with the Separability of Persons in risky prospects as defined in Section 5.
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end up well off (so that each will face an individual prospect of <(1+δ);924
0>) or with benefits of (1+δ)/2 each if they end up poorly off (so that each925
will face an individual sure prospect of <(1+δ)/2; (1+δ)/2>). Then the926
Prioritarian social planner should strictly prefer the latter, since it is better927
to provide a fixed benefit to a person at a low level of utility rather than at928
a high level of utility. Hence she will strictly rank Equal Distribution over929
Lucky State.11930
(b) Lucky State and Fair Lottery. The textual evidence is not completely931
watertight, but I think that a case can bemade that Parfit would rank Lucky932
State  Fair Lottery. Two passages are relevant.933
First, Parfit discusses the following case. Take Fair Lottery and Lucky934
State as your starting points. Suppose that in each case you have a choice935
between either providing a smaller benefit to the worse off or a larger936
benefit to the better off. Egalitarians, according to Parfit, have a stronger937
reason to prefer benefitting the worse off in the case of Fair Lottery than938
Lucky State, since it reduces the inequality within states; Prioritarians,939
however, have an equally good reason to do so in both cases, since from940
each person’s ‘point of view, there is no difference between these cases.’941
(2012: 416, n. 17) Now return to the original Fair Lottery and Lucky State.942
From each person’s point of view, there is no difference between these943
prospects either. So we would expect Parfit to defend Lucky State  Fair944
Lottery.945
Second, Parfit writes: ‘When we compare the strength of two people’s946
claims to receive some benefit, it is often enough to know how well off,947
or badly off, these two people are. In such cases, we do not need to know948
how these people’s levels of well-being compare with the levels of other949
people . . . ’ (2012: 439) He does defend Separability of Persons here, but950
the phrasing is in terms of certain prospects and it is not clear that he951
would be willing to extend the principle to risky prospects. If he does, this952
would provide an additional argument for Lucky State Fair Lottery as we953
saw in Section 5.954
(c) Fair Lottery and Favoured Person. Parfit would have the social955
planner strictly prefer Fair Lottery to Favoured Person, on grounds956
that it is valuable to give people equal chances to become well957
off (Parfit 2012: 431) and on grounds that we should be concerned958
about people who are poorly off in their expectations (Parfit 2012:959
432).960
11 This strict ranking can also be supported by extending Parfit’s Case Three (2012: 406) or by
extending principle (D) (2012: 411).
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Summing up, Rabinowicz and Parfit and Fleurbaey/Otsuka/961
Voorhoeve disagree about ranking the hard cases:962
(R) Equal Distribution  Lucky State  Fair Lottery  Favoured Person963
(FOV) Equal Distribution  Lucky State  Fair Lottery  Favoured Person964
(P) Equal Distribution  Lucky State  Fair Lottery  Favoured Person965
We can check what quadruples of α-parameters would yield these966
orderings on my value function vATC. Mathematical computation yields967
the following results:968
The (R) ordering holds if and only if the ex post parameters are969
equal, i.e. αEDE = αRASE, and the ex ante parameters are equal, i.e. αRAE970
= αEDPPE, and at least one of these values is greater than 0. Rabinowicz’s971
position is ordinally equivalent to a position with equal-strength ex ante972
distributional concerns, equal-strength ex post distributional concerns, and973
at least one of these concerns is present.974
The (FOV) ordering holds if and only if αEDE > 0, αRAE = αRASE = 0,975
and αEDPPE  0. Fleurbaey, Otsuka and Voorhoeve are concerned about976
the poorly off in the intra-state distribution. They also want to respect the977
expectations of the persons as well as the social expectations, i.e. theywant978
the risk-absent equivalent for persons and for states to be set at zero. For979
Fair Lottery  Favoured Person, we set αEDPPE = 0. If we wish to move to980
a strict preference for Fair Lottery  Favoured Person in (FOV), then we981
need to secure a concern for the poorly off in the inter-personal-prospect982
distribution, i.e. we need a strict inequality in αEDPPE > 0.983
The (P) ordering holds if and only if αEDE = αRASE  0 and αEDPPE >984
αRAE  0 and at least one of the weak inequalities is a strict inequality. In985
addition, note that Parfit does prefer a smaller benefit in the one person986
case (i). This requires that we set αRAE > 0 since the intra-personal-prospect987
distribution is the only relevant distribution in the one-person case. So988
we can obtain the ordering in question by adding a sufficiently strong989
concern for the inter-personal-prospect distribution, i.e. αEDPPE > αRAE. This990
squares with Parfit’s insistence that we should favour people with lower991
expectations (2012: 432). In addition, the ordering remains unaffected992
when we choose to add equally strong ex post distributional concerns for993
the intra-state and the inter-state distributions.994
We can sum up the positions as follows. Rabinowicz’s ordering is995
attained on grounds of equally strong ex ante concerns or equally strong ex996
post concerns. Fleurbaey, Otsuka and Voorhoeve’s ordering is attained on997
grounds of an ex post concern for the intra-state distribution and possibly an998
ex ante concern for the inter-personal-prospect distribution. Parfit’s ordering999
is attained on grounds of ex ante concerns for both the intra-personal-1000
prospect distribution and the inter-personal-prospect distribution, with the1001
latter concern being stronger than the former, and, furthermore, these ex1002
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ante concerns may but need not be mixed with ex post concerns of equal1003
strength.1004
One can actually gain more insight why the particular orderings come1005
about due to certain distributional concerns by looking back at Table 5.1006
Consider Rabinowicz’s ranking (R) with equal ex post parameters, equal1007
ex ante parameters and at least one parameter greater than 0.1008
First, why do the ex post parameters have to be equal and why do the1009
ex ante parameters have to be equal? Focus on Lucky State and Fair Lottery.1010
For reductio, suppose that αEDE > αRASE. Then Lucky State  Fair Lottery,1011
since, on our supposition, we care more about Intra-State Distribution than1012
about Inter-State Distribution and Lucky State meets the former but not the1013
latter and Fair Lottery meets the latter but not the former. But, we know1014
that, on (R), Lucky State  Fair Lottery. Hence it cannot be the case that1015
αEDE > αRASE. A similar reductio argument shows that it cannot be the case1016
that αEDE < αRASE. So, given Lucky State  Fair Lottery, αEDE = αRASE. By1017
a parallel argument, starting from Fair Lottery  Favoured Person, αRAE =1018
αEDPPE.1019
Second, why do the ex post parameters or the ex ante parameters (or1020
both) have to be larger than zero? Suppose that they are all zero. Then1021
none of the concerns would matter and we would be indifferent between1022
all four cases, which contradicts (R). Hence, at least one must be greater1023
than zero.1024
In a similar vein, one can construct arguments to explain why the1025
orderings (FOV) and (P) yield constraints on the α-parameters, i.e. on the1026
social planner’s respective distributional concerns.1027
8. SUMMARY1028
I have developed a comprehensive model that captures various1029
distributional concerns in the evaluation of uncertain prospects.1030
Ex ante evaluations can register a concern for the intra-personal-prospect1031
distribution and a concern for the inter-personal-prospect distribution. Ex1032
post evaluations can register a concern for the intra-state-distribution1033
and a concern for the inter-state-distributions. I extend Fleurbaey’s1034
method for calculating the Equally Distributed Equivalent (2010) to all1035
of these distributional concerns and construct an all things considered value1036
function that integrates ex ante and ex post concerns.1037
The model permits us to register distributional concerns and generate1038
an ordering over a set of prospects. It also lets us start from an ordering1039
over a set of prospects and extract a characterization of the range of1040
distributional concerns that may underlie it. We can thus move back and1041
forth between a social planner’s distributional concerns and his orderings1042
over prospects until reflective equilibrium is reached.1043
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I apply the model to a range of ‘hard cases’ and show how alternative1044
orderings over these cases reflect different distributional concerns on the1045
side of the social planner.1046
I make use of a transform which satisfies Separability of Persons for1047
certain prospects and Separability of States for single-person prospects.1048
If we find this unreasonable we can substitute rank-order sensitive1049
transforms which violate these constraints.1050
The model casts light on Ubel et al.’s poll results that show a1051
tension between the aim of maximizing survival rates and the aim of1052
equalizing the expectation of survival in choosing between medical tests1053
and on Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve’s critique of ex ante Pareto reasoning in1054
determining alternative regimes of cancer screening.1055
Finally, when applied to the hard cases, the model captures1056
Rabinowicz’s interpretation of Parfit’s Prioritarianism for risky prospects,1057
the objection of Otsuka and Voorhoeve to Prioritarianism for risky1058
prospects, and Parfit’s defence of Prioritarianism for risky prospects.1059
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